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1. Introduction
Contracts are valuable because they provide commitment to the parties that signed the
agreement.Thiscommitmentiscreatedthroughthe(implicit)speciﬁcationofwhathappens
if one of the parties fails to perform. Breach remedies make this explicit. They specify how
to calculate the amount of compensation the defaulting party has to pay. In this paper we
focusonthefourmostprominenttypesofbreachremedies(cf.Posner,1977,Cooter&Ulen,
1997, Edlin, 1998):
• liquidated damages: the breacher has to pay a ﬁxed amount to the victim of breach. The
amount to be paid is speciﬁed in the initial contract;
• expectation damages: the breacher has to pay the amount that makes the victim equally
well off as under contract performance;
• reliancedamages:thebreachercompensatesthevictimsuchthatthelatterisequallywell
off as before the contract had been signed;
• speciﬁc performance: breach of contract is not possible. An agent is required to stay in
the relation if the other party asks him to do so.
The ﬁrst three remedies all specify a sum of money that the breacher has to pay to the
innocent party. This expresses a “ liability rule”, which is common under Anglo-American
common law and uncommon in civil law systems. In contrast, the remedy of speciﬁc per-
formance corresponds to a “property rule”. This is common in civil law systems but rare in
common law systems (cf. Ulen, 1998).
Breach remedies play an important role in protecting (non-contractable) relationship-
speciﬁc investments.1 Without contractual commitment, underinvestment is likely to occur
becauseofholdup(cf.Klein,Crawford,&Alchian,1978,Williamson,1985).Holdupentails
that, after reliance expenditures are made, the other party may behave opportunistically by
threatening to terminate the relationship. Such a threat permits this party to obtain better
terms of trade than were initially agreed upon and thereby to capture some of the returns
on the speciﬁc investment made by the other party. Anticipating that she may be unable to
reap the full return, the investor will invest less than the efﬁcient level. Breach remedies
can be used to overcome this holdup underinvestment problem, because they effectively
protect the investor against appropriation of the return on the investment by the trading
party.
The theoretical literature predicts that breach remedies typically provide too much pro-
tection,therebycausingoverreliance.Twodistinctmotivesdrivesuchoverinvestment.First,
with the exception of liquidated damages, the above breach remedies effectively insure the
investor against separation. She still gets some private return on the investment made, even
whenitisefﬁcientforthepartiestoseparateandthespeciﬁcinvestmenthasnosocialreturn.
This is the insurance motive; the investor is insured against states in which a third party
has a higher valuation for the good (and therefore buys it in the end). The second motive
1 These are investments that are proﬁtable only in the event of contract performance and they are, within the
law and economics literature, usually referred to as reliance expenditures. In this paper we use the terms (speciﬁc)
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Fig. 1. Timing of events in the holdup game.
to overinvest is only operative under reliance damages. In this case the investor is better
off when the parties trade than when they efﬁciently separate. She may therefore have an
incentive to invest at least so much such that the valuation within the relationship exceeds
the highest possible valuation of an outside party. This is the separation prevention motive.
Only liquidated damages that are set at an appropriate level can avoid both overinvestment
motives and provide the investor with the incentive to invest the efﬁcient amount. All these
predictions hold irrespective of whether the initial contract can be renegotiated ex post, or
not; see Rogerson (1984) and Shavell (1980), respectively.
Whether the various breach remedies perform as theory predicts and indeed cause over-
reliance is an empirical issue. In an earlier experimental study Sloof, Leuven, Oosterbeek,
and Sonnemans (2003) take a ﬁrst step in investigating this. They establish that the two
overinvestment motives are indeed operative in a setting without renegotiation. Their ex-
periment serves as point of departure for the present one. In particular, in this paper we
extend the experiment of Sloof et al. by allowing for ex post renegotiation. This makes the
experimental setting much more realistic (see below).
The timing of events in the game that we study is represented in Fig. 1. The game relates
to a bilateral trading situation between a female Buyer and a male Seller over one unit of
a particular good. At time 0 the parties sign a contract that speciﬁes a ﬁxed price at which
they will trade. This ﬁxed price cannot be conditioned on Buyer’s investment decision.
Subsequently, at time 1, Buyer makes an investment that increases her valuation of the
good. Afterwards, at time 2, the parties learn for how much Seller can sell his unit to an
alternative buyer. When this outside bid is known, Seller decides at time 3 whether to stick
to the initial contract and to sell his unit to Buyer, or to breach the contract. When Seller
decides to breach, he has to pay damages to Buyer. In either case – both after breach and
after no breach – Buyer and Seller have the opportunity to renegotiate at time 4 the terms
of trade and separation, respectively.
TheexperimentsreportedinSloofetal.(2003)capturestages0–3,butomitstage4.2 The
main ﬁndings are that observed investment levels closely follow the theoretical predictions.
Appropriately designed liquidated damages do not induce overinvestment, as predicted.
In case of expectation damages, the insurance motive to overinvest indeed appears to be
operative.Andincaseofreliancedamages,boththeinsuranceandtheseparationprevention
motive are at work. The remedy of speciﬁc performance was not considered in this earlier
study.
2 In the actual design of the experiments the initial contract is pre-determined for the subjects, implying that the
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Inthepresentexperimentweaddstage4tothegame.3Thisenablesatestofthetheoretical
prediction that adding a renegotiation stage does not affect investment incentives. This is
importantfortworeasons.First,allowingforrenegotiationismuchmorerealistic.Inpractice
it is highly unlikely that the interaction between the contracting parties ends with a breach
decision when this decision results in an inefﬁcient outcome. In case it appears ex post that
partiescangainfromrenegotiation,theyarelikelytodoso.Partiestypicallycannotcredibly
commit not to renegotiate inefﬁcient outcomes (cf. Edlin & Hermalin, 2000).
A second motivation for adding the renegotiation stage is that bargaining inefﬁciencies
may have a profound effect on investment incentives. Most of the existing theoretical work
considerstheholdupprobleminsettingswhereexpostrenegotiationstakeplaceundersym-
metricinformation.Bargaininginefﬁcienciesarethenpredictednottooccurinequilibrium.
By construction such losses are also absent in Sloof et al. (2003). Yet it is well-known from
bothlaboratoryexperimentsandﬁelddatathatinpracticerenegotiationsoftendocausesub-
stantial efﬁciency losses, even when bargaining takes place under symmetric information.
This may in turn affect investment incentives. For example, one could reasonably expect
lessoverinvestment,becausetheinvestorrealizesthatsomeofthe(social)returnsoninvest-
ment leak away in protracted bargaining. Recent theoretical work by Lau (2002) on holdup
underasymmetricinformationhasshownthatbargaininginefﬁcienciescanactuallybegood
for investment incentives. A similar result may be observed in practice under symmetric
information when bargaining brings about (theoretically unpredicted) inefﬁciencies.
The main ﬁndings of this paper are two-fold. First, the two overinvestment motives
are also present in the setup with ex post renegotiation, again causing overreliance. In
line with theoretical predictions the insurance motive is present under reliance damages,
expectation damages and speciﬁc performance. And the separation prevention motive is
indeed operative under reliance damages only. Together with the earlier results obtained for
the no-renegotiation setup, our current ﬁndings reveal that the two overinvestment motives
are very robust.
Second,ourresultssuggestthatthereisnostrongneedforsophisticatedbreachremedies
based on compensatory money damages. Realized efﬁciency is higher either in the absence
of a contract or under speciﬁc performance, compared with the three remedies of liquidated
damages, reliance damages and expectation damages.4 In particular, when the probability
of a high outside bid is low and separation therefore unlikely to be efﬁcient, none of these
three remedies performs better than speciﬁc performance. In the opposite case where the
probability of a high outside bid is high, breach remedies do not induce higher efﬁciency
3 Our ordering of stages 3 and 4 follows Che and Chung (1999). The reason for this is two-fold. First, it makes
the present experiment better comparable with the benchmark study of Sloof et al. (2003). Second, in practice
parties typically cannot threat not to renegotiate inefﬁcient outcomes (cf. Edlin & Hermalin, 2000). Because the
breach decision itself may result in an inefﬁcient outcome, one therefore should allow for renegotiations after
Seller’s breach decision. A more elaborate justiﬁcation for the particular timing we use is given in Appendix B.1,
which can be downloaded from the ﬁrst author’s website: www1.fee.uva.nl/scholar/mdw/sloof/.
4 The latter three remedies are labeled ‘sophisticated’, because their implementation relies on a careful deter-
mination of the exact amount that has to be paid. As noted before, the sophisticated breach remedies correspond
to an entitlement (to Seller’s good) protected by a liability rule, while speciﬁc performance is equivalent to an
entitlement protected by a property right. The literature on the protection of entitlements (see e.g. Bebchuk (2002)
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levels than under no contract. The main reason for this is that without a contract holdup
appears less of a problem than theory predicts.
Our ﬁndings add to the debate on optimal breach remedies in contracts. As already
mentioned above, according to standard theory the remedy of liquidated damages has
the potential of providing parties with the proper investment incentives. In light of this,
Mahoney(2000, p. 127) ﬁnds it puzzling that courts will often not enforce liquidated dam-
ageclauses.Ourempiricalresultssuggestthatthisbehaviorofcourtsmaybelessinefﬁcient
than Mahoney suggests; in practice liquidated damages may perform less well than theory
predicts. In line with Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998), a more behavioral approach to
breach remedies and holdup thus seems warranted.
In the experiment the probability distribution of outside bids is exogenously given. In
realitythisisnotthecase,becausecontractingpartnersareendogenouslychosen.Inmaking
their choice parties will typically look for a contracting partner with whom trade is likely
to be efﬁcient. From this perspective our treatment in which separation is unlikely to be
efﬁcient is the more realistic and interesting one. The ﬁndings for this treatment then point
at the attractiveness – i.e. small inefﬁciency losses – of using speciﬁc performance.
Various legal scholars have built a case for the use of speciﬁc performance based on
efﬁciency grounds, see Mahoney (2000) and Ulen (1998) for overviews. The theoretical
argument put forward is that in practice compensatory money damages are likely to be
under-compensatory. As Ulen (1998) puts it:
“...inpractice, there may be an efﬁciency advantage for speciﬁc performance as the
default remedy. This is due to the possibility of court error in accurately computing
expectation damages and the current legal limitations on the ability of contracting
parties to specify liquidated damages. ...Until we have compelling empirical evi-
dence, the choice between speciﬁc performance and legal relief [i.e. compensatory
money damages], ...turns on one’s comparative estimate of the risk of error from
parties’ failure to reach an efﬁcient outcome under speciﬁc performance and the risk
of error in a court’s estimating damages (plus the costs of litigation).”
In our experiment the informational problems attached to sophisticated breach remedies
are absent by construction. Even then it appears that, given actually observed behavior,
speciﬁc performance may perform best from an efﬁciency perspective. We feel that this
ﬁnding makes “the case for speciﬁc performance” (cf. Schwartz, 1979) more compelling.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the basic
setup of the experimental game and derive the equilibrium predictions for the three breach
remedies based on compensatory money damages. Section 3 presents the experimental
design, while Section 4 reports the results. In Section 5 we investigate what happens in
the absence of sophisticated damage payments. In particular, we present the results for the
two polar cases of no contract and speciﬁc performance. In both cases there is no breach
decision stage, because in the absence of a contract there is simply no contract that can
be breached whereas under speciﬁc performance breach is explicitly excluded. Section 6
compares all ﬁve different cases in terms of efﬁciency. The ﬁnal section summarizes our
main ﬁndings and concludes.268 R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296
2. Sophisticated breach remedies
2.1. Basic setup of the model
In this subsection we provide a precise description of the game reﬂected in Fig. 1.F o r
ease of exposition this description is cast in terms of the speciﬁc parameter values that are
used in the experiment.5
Two risk neutral parties, labeled Buyer and Seller, may trade one unit of a particular
good. Before actual trade takes place, Buyer can make a speciﬁc investment I that increases
her valuation of Seller’s product. Production costs are normalized to zero. Seller may also
sell his single unit outside the relationship at a ﬁxed price. This outside bid is unknown
at the time Buyer decides on her reliance expenditure. It can either be low or high. The
probability that the latter case applies is used as a treatment variable. The game now has
the following speciﬁc setup and sequence of events:
0. Contracting stage. Buyer and Seller sign a contract specifying that trade takes place
at ﬁxed price 4 · f = 4 · (600),6 and also include a damage schedule 4 · δ(I)i nt h e
contract;
1. Investment stage. Buyer makes a speciﬁc investment I ∈{ 0,5,10,...,100}. The size
of the investment determines Buyer’s valuation of the good, which equals 4 · R(I) = 4 ·
(1000 + 100 · I). Investment costs equal 4 · C(I) = 4 · (I2) and are immediately borne
by Buyer;
2. Nature draws outside bid. The value of Seller’s alternative trading opportunity b ∈
{0,7000} becomes publicly known. The prior probability that b = 7000 equals either
p = (1/5) (Low-treatment) or p = (3/5) (High-treatment);
3. Breachdecisionstage.Sellerdecideswhethertobreachthecontractornot.Thisdecision
determines the gross surplus up for renegotiation RS and the threat points TPi (for
i = S,B) that apply in every round of the bargaining stage, see stage 4 below. If Seller
breaches, it holds that:
RS = R(I), TPB = δ(I)andTPS = b − δ(I),
and if Seller does not breach, we have:
RS = b, TPB = R(I) − f andTPS = f;
4. Bargaining stage. Buyer and Seller ﬁrst simultaneously decide whether they want to
renegotiate or not. Only when both agree to do so, actual renegotiations take place. In
thatcaseBuyerandSelleralternateinmakingoffersuptoamaximumoffourbargaining
5 Appendix B, available at the ﬁrst author’s website, discusses a more general speciﬁcation of the model and
also formally derives the equilibrium predictions.
6 Hence f = 600. The interpretation of the factor 4 will become clear below when we discuss the players’
payoffs. Note that the initial contract is pre-determined and cannot be chosen by the parties themselves. A full
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rounds, of how to divide four equally sized pies of size RS. Seller makes the ﬁrst offer.
In case of acceptance all remaining pies – including the one of the current round – are
divided according to the proposal agreed upon. During a round of disagreement the pie
of that round vanishes and both parties receive their threat point payoffs. When parties
decide not to renegotiate Buyer and Seller obtain four times their threat point payoffs.
TheoverallpayoffsΠB andΠS ofBuyerandSellerdependontheabsolutesharesSeller
receives of the round pie of size RS, and on the bargaining round t during which parties
reach agreement (in case of no renegotiations or no agreement t = 5):
ΠB = (5 − t) · (RS − s) + (t − 1) · TPB − 4 · C(I) (1)
ΠS = (5 − t) · s + (t − 1) · TPS (2)
For ease of exposition we will in the sequel always work with the average payoffs per
bargaining round. These are given by πi = Πi/4 for i = B,S. Note that the number of
bargaining rounds just works as a scaling factor. For any even number of bargaining rounds
the equilibrium predictions concerning investment levels and the division of the surplus are
exactlythesame(cf.Sloof,2004).Byconsideringtheaveragepayoffsperbargaininground
all results become directly comparable with those in Sloof et al. (2003) where exactly the
same parameterization for R(I), C(I), f and b is used.
Intuitively the order of play can be interpreted as follows. At the start of the game the
status quo is trade according to the terms of the initial contract; Seller sells to Buyer at a
ﬁxed price of f = 600. After the outside bid becomes known Seller may change this status
quo outcome into separation, just by breaching the contract and paying δ(I) to Buyer. This
change may be attractive for Seller, either because separation itself is more proﬁtable, or
because it induces a proﬁtable (i.e. upwards) renegotiation of the initial trade price of 600.
Hence, breach of contract does not necessarily lead to separation, because the parties may
renegotiate this decision into trade. The same applies when Seller decides not to breach.
This does not necessarily lead to trade, because parties may renegotiate into separation at
a lower damage payment. In general, the parties can renegotiate the outcome of Seller’s
breach decision to arrive at the ex post efﬁcient outcome.
Thethreesophisticatedbreachremediesthatwestudyarecharacterizedbythefollowing
damage payments:
• Liquidated damages (LI): δLI(I) = δLI = 3400;
• Expectation damages (EX): δEX(I) = R(I) − f = R(I) − 600;
• Reliance damages (RE): δRE(I) = C(I) = I2.
The main question of interest is whether these damage payments create efﬁcient invest-
mentincentives.Ourparameterchoicesaresuchthat(fortheefﬁcientinvestmentlevel)trade
is efﬁcient when b = 0, while separation is efﬁcient when b = 7000. From a social point
of view the investment thus only pays off when b = 0. It is straightforward to derive that
the efﬁcient level equals I∗ = 40 in the Low-treatment (p = 1/5) and I∗ = 20 in the High-
treatment (p = 3/5). Note that the efﬁcient reliance level is decreasing in p. Comparative
statics in p will play an important role in detecting the two motives to overinvest.270 R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296
2.2. Equilibrium predictions
The subgame perfect equilibria of the game described in the previous subsection can
be obtained through backwards induction. In this subsection we provide a more intuitive
explanation of equilibrium behavior.7 We do so by comparing the current setup with the
one in which the renegotiation stage is absent.
First suppose that renegotiation is not possible. The game then ends with Seller’s breach
decision in stage 3. In that case, when Seller does not breach he obtains the ﬁxed price f.I n
case of breach he sells his single unit to the outside buyer at price b, but also has to pay the
original Buyer δ(I) in damages. Seller thus chooses to breach if f<b− δ(I).8
Next consider what happens in the presence of ex post renegotiation. When the breach
decision of Seller induces the efﬁcient outcome – i.e. trade when R(I) ≥ b and no-trade in
case b>R (I) – renegotiations will not take place. This holds because no agreement exists
that makes both Buyer and Seller better off. In case Seller’s breach decision would lead
to an inefﬁcient outcome, such mutually beneﬁcial agreements do exist. Theory predicts
that then renegotiations will take place. The predicted outcome of the particular bargaining
game employed coincides with the Nash bargaining solution (cf. Sloof, 2004). This entails
that both parties receive their threat point payoffs and that the remaining surplus is divided
equally. This is often referred to as the split-the-difference solution.
Obviously, Seller’s breach decision changes in the presence of renegotiation. He now
also has to take into account that inefﬁcient outcomes are renegotiated into efﬁcient ones,
yielding him an additional beneﬁt. In particular, no breach will yield him now f + (1/2) ·
max{b − R(I),0}. The second term follows from the fact that when separation is efﬁcient,
Seller’sdecisionnottobreachwillberenegotiatedintoseparation.Thejointgainsb − R(I)
fromdoingsoarethensharedequally.Similarly,breachleadstopayoffsequaltob − δ(I) +
(1/2) · max{R(I) − b,0} for Seller. Here the second term follows from renegotiating an




· (R(I) − b) (3)
Compared to the no-renegotiation case the last term on the r.h.s. is added. Breach thus
becomes relatively more (less) attractive when b is low (high).
UnderwhatcircumstancesSellerbreachesdependsonthedamagepaymentδ(I)inplace.
In case of liquidated damages (LI) the breach decision depends on the exact amount δLI.
Three main cases can be distinguished. First, for a sufﬁciently low ﬁxed payment, Seller
breaches both when b is low and when b is high. Second, for a sufﬁciently high ﬁxed
payment, Seller never breaches.9 Third, the ﬁxed payment can equal an intermediate value
such that Seller breaches only when b is high. Our choice of δLI = 3400 ﬁts within this
7 The formal derivation can be found in Appendix B, which is available on the ﬁrst author’s website.
8 Here we resolve any indifference in favor of selling to (the incumbent) Buyer. This tie-breaking assumption is
inessential for our results.
9 The ﬁrst case formally corresponds with the no-contract situation, the second one with the remedy of speciﬁc
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intermediate case.10 Anticipating Seller’s breach decision, Buyer then realizes that her
investment pays off only when b = 0. She therefore chooses the efﬁcient investment level
ILI = I∗. Recall that the efﬁcient investment level is decreasing in the probability of a
high outside bid. Because for the equilibrium investment level Seller’s equilibrium breach
decision is efﬁcient, renegotiations are predicted not to occur.
Under expectation damages (EX) inequality (3) reduces to 0 < (1/2) · (b − R(I)). This
implies that the equilibrium breach decision is always efﬁcient. For any level of invest-
ment chosen renegotiations are therefore predicted not to occur. With expectation dam-
ages Buyer’s payoff is independent of Seller’s breach decision. She obtains her expectancy
R(I) − 600ineithercase.ItfollowsimmediatelythatshechoosesIEX = 50inequilibrium,
irrespective of the value of p. Overinvestment under EX is due to the full insurance motive.
Buyer is fully protected against separation.
Finally consider the case of reliance damages (RE). Here Buyer is also fully insured
againstseparation.Shethereforeinvestsatleast50.Butnowthereisanadditionalmotiveto
overinvest.Toseethis,considerSeller’sbreachdecision.GiventherelevantrangeofI ≥ 50,
Seller never breaches when b = 0. But in case of b = 7000, Seller breaches whenever
I ≤ 85. He does so either to trade with the outside buyer (50 ≤ I<60 ), or to renegotiate
better terms of trade with the original Buyer (i.e. when I ≥ 60 and thus R(I) ≥ 7000).
In the former case Buyer is compensated completely for the investment costs made. She
thus obtains a net payoff of zero. In the latter case, besides being reimbursed fully for the
costs of investment, Buyer also receives a net proﬁt in the form of an equal share of the
surplus up for renegotiation R(I) − 7000. In principle this gives her an incentive to invest
just up to the amount for which Seller is still willing to breach the contract and pay reliance
compensation,i.e.I = 85.HereBuyeroverinveststomakeseparationinefﬁcient.However,
Buyer also has to realize that she has to bear the costs of investment when it turns out that
b = 0 and Seller does not breach. This reduces her incentives to invest more than 50.
Which of the above two effects dominates depends on p. When a high outside bid is
rather unlikely (p = (1/5)), it does not pay for Buyer to affect the outcome under this
contingency. Here only the insurance motive to overinvest is present and Buyer chooses
IRE = 50. Renegotiations are then predicted not to occur. But when p is relatively high
(p = (3/5)) it does pay for Buyer to affect the efﬁcient outcome when the outside bid
is high. In that case Buyer chooses IRE = 85,11 such that Seller surely breaches when
b = 7000. This triggers renegotiation, to arrive at the ex post efﬁcient outcome. In this
second case both the insurance and the separation prevention motive are present. Note that
under RE equilibrium investment levels are increasing in p.
The main equilibrium predictions are summarized in Table 1. Under liquidated dam-
ages investment is predicted to be efﬁcient, while under expectation damages and reliance
damages overinvestment is predicted to occur. The correlation between I and p can be
used to detect the two motives to overinvest. When this correlation is negative, neither the
full-insurance nor the breach-prevention motive appears to be effective. In case observed
10 Actually breach is also predicted to occur when b is low and a very high investment level I is chosen; for our
parameters I>70. Such high investment levels are typically not observed.
11 This equilibrium level follows from allowing multiples of 5 only. In the continuous case the equilibrium




Investment level I ILI = ﬁrst best IEX > ﬁrst best IRE > ﬁrst best
Correlation between I and p Negative Zero Positive
Occurrence of renegotiation None None Only in High treatment (for b = 7000)
Efﬁciency of renegotiation Efﬁcient Efﬁcient Efﬁcient
investment levels are independent of p (only) the full insurance motive appears to be at
work. A positive correlation between I and p indicates that both motives to overinvest are
operative. Renegotiations are predicted to occur only when it is in the parties’ joint in-
terest. On the equilibrium path, i.e. when Buyers’ investment choices and Sellers’ breach
decisions correspond with equilibrium behavior, this implies that they will occur only in
the RE-High treatment. And whenever they occur, renegotiations are predicted to yield the
efﬁcient outcome without costly delay.
3. Experimental design
We ran two sessions per breach remedy. Within a session subjects were confronted with
both the Low and the High-treatment. Per session 20 subjects participated, giving 120
subjects in total. They were recruited from the undergraduate student population of the
University of Amsterdam. Most of them were students in economics. Subjects received a
show up fee of 30,000 experimental points. The conversion rate was one guilder for 2200
points, such that one US dollar corresponded with about 5500 points. Average earnings
were USD 19.50 in about two hours.
Each session consisted of 12 periods in which subjects played the four-stage game.
These 12 periods were divided into two blocks of six. In one block the value of p was 1/5
(Low-treatment), in the other block p was equal to 3/5 (High-treatment). To control for
order effects we conducted for each breach remedy one Low-High session and one High-
Low session. Subjects’ roles varied over the rounds. Within each treatment each subject
was assigned the role of Buyer three times, and the role of Seller also three times. In each
period subjects were anonymously (re)matched. Within a treatment they could meet each
otheronlyonce.Subjectswereexplicitlyinformedaboutthis.Toenhancecomparabilitythe
empirical distribution of the outside bid b was exactly the same over the different sessions.
We used a distribution that in the aggregate exactly matches the theoretical distribution, but
contains sufﬁcient variation over the individual subjects.
The experiment was framed as follows. At the start of each period subjects learned their
roles. Then Buyer (subject A) had to choose the amount T, a multiple of ﬁve between 0
and 100. (T thus reﬂects investment choice I .) The costs of this choice equalled 4 · T2
and were immediately subtracted from Buyer’s account. In the second stage a wheel of
fortune determined the value of the outside bid. The wheel had two colors in proportions
to the respective probabilities of a low (blue) and a high (yellow) outside bid. When the
wheel came to a stop it pointed at a particular color. This color determined the value of
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decision of Seller determined the starting point of the renegotiations. The bargaining stage
was organized as described in Section 2.1.
The experiment was computerized. Subjects started with on-screen instructions. Before
theexperimentstartedsubjectshadtoansweranumberofquestionscorrectly.Subjectsalso
received a summary of the instructions on paper.12 The instructions were phrased neutrally.
In particular, words like opponent, game, investment, buyer or seller were not used. Before
the play of the 12 periods one practice period was played. At the end of the experiment
subjects ﬁlled out a short questionnaire and the earned experimental points were converted
to money. Subjects were paid individually and discreetly.
Wemadealargeefforttopresenttheprocedurestothesubjectsinaveryclearandacces-
sible way. The instructions explained carefully how the combination of Buyer’s choice of T
instage1,Nature’sdrawofbinstage2andSeller’sbreachdecisioninstage3togetherdeter-
mined the threat points and the renegotiation surplus for stage 4. After each decision/draw,
theconsequencesweremadeexplicit.Inparticular,beforethebuyer’sinvestmentchoicethe
subjects had on their screens a table which expresses payoffs as functions of T, b (the color
of the wheel) and Seller’s breach options (X or Y). After the buyer made her investment
choice, the actually chosen value of T replaced the symbol T. Before the wheel of fortune
turned, the table contained amounts in yellow and blue. When the wheel stopped at e.g.
yellow, the amounts in yellow remained yellow, while those in blue became grey because
they were no longer relevant. Similarly, after Seller’s choice between X and Y the numbers
belonging to the option that was not chosen became grey. In this way, subjects received the
information about decisions and draws made in the previous stages and their consequences




Our ﬁrst result concerns the relationship between reliance levels and the probability of
a high outside bid.
Result 1. Under LI reliance levels are decreasing in p, while under EX
they remain virtually constant. Under RE reliance levels increase when p incre-
ases.
Evidence for Result 1 is provided in Table 2, which reports average investment levels
by treatment. (Ignore the columns labeled “optimum” for the moment.) Recall that each
subject in the experiment makes six investment decisions: three decisions in the Low-
treatment and three decisions in the High-treatment. For each subject we calculated the
mean investment levels in these two treatments. We report the results of statistical tests
12 A translation of this summary sheet can be downloaded from the ﬁrst author’s website:
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based on these average investment levels of individual investors.13 Wilcoxon signrank tests
are used to test for differences within a row (last column in upper part) and Mann-Whitney
ranksum tests for differences within a column (see the lower part of Table 2). We always
use (the more conservative) two-sided tests.
Result 1 relates to the within-remedy comparisons. In line with theoretical predictions
investment levels are decreasing in p under liquidated damages. Under EX we observe a
5% decrease in case p increases. While statistically signiﬁcant, economically the size of
this effect can be viewed as modest. We therefore conclude that under EX investment levels
remain virtually constant. Under RE investment levels are increasing in p, as predicted.14
The next result relates to the absolute reliance levels and to a comparison across the
different damage payments.
Result2. (i)InboththeLowandtheHigh-treatmentreliancelevelsaresigniﬁcantlyhigher
under EX and RE than under LI. (ii) Reliance levels are also signiﬁcantly higher under RE
than under EX. (iii) Under all three remedies overinvestment occurs.
Evidence for the ﬁrst two parts of Result 2 is provided in the lower part of Table 2.
Ranksum tests reveal that the between-remedy differences in reliance levels are in all cases
signiﬁcant.ExceptforEX-LowversusRE-Low,thesigniﬁcantdifferencesfoundareinline
withthetheoreticalpredictions.15 Speciﬁcally,underLIreliancelevelsarelowerthanunder
EX and RE, and reliance levels are higher in the RE-High treatment than in EX-High.
ThethirdpartofResult2followsfromacomparisonoftheaveragereliancelevelswiththe
predicted levels. Taking all investment decisions into account, it turns out that in two of the
six treatments average reliance levels deviate substantially from the theoretical predictions.
For LI-High the actual investment level exceeds the predicted level by more than 50%. For
13 These tests are based on pooled sessions. Using Mann–Whitney ranksum tests, in ﬁve out of six treatments we
found no differences at the 5% level in investment rates between the two sessions that were held for each of the
treatments. (These tests are based on the mean reliance levels per p-level of each subject.) The single exception
concerns the EX-High treatment. Here reliance levels in one session were signiﬁcantly higher than in the other
session (51.75 > 46.75, p = 0.003). This points at an order effect; the higher investment levels are observed for
the Low-High order. Yet for the other ﬁve treatments order effects are absent. Pooling over the sessions does not
affectourconclusions.WhenweconsiderthetwoEXsessionsinisolation,weobservethatinoneofthemreliance
levels are signiﬁcantly decreasing in the probability of a high outside bid (p = 0.02), but in the other session this
is not the case. There reliance levels under the EX-Low and EX-high treatment are not signiﬁcantly different from
each other (p = 0.48). This supports the conclusion drawn in Result 1.
14 In the experiment we used a rotating scheme that divides the 20 subjects within a session into two groups
that were independently matched. Members of one group were never matched with members of the other group.
This gives for each remedy four independent “group-level” observations. Using groups rather than subjects as
the independent unit of observation allows for an alternative test. With four matched pairs of observations per
remedy, the smallest possible signiﬁcance level that a two-tailed signrank test can attain equals 0.125. For LI and
RE we ﬁnd exactly this level. For EX the p-value obtained from the group-level comparison equals 0.375. The
latter ﬁnding provides an additional justiﬁcation for using the term ‘virtually’ in Result 1.
15 For the situation without renegotiation Sloof et al. (2003) also found that reliance expenditures under RE-Low
aresigniﬁcantlylargerthanunderEX-Low(whereastheorypredictsthemtobeequal).However,usinggrouplevel
data rather than individual level data leads to an insigniﬁcant p-value of p = 0.1572 (the smallest signiﬁcance




































































Mean investment levels by treatment and tests for equality
Damages Low: p = (1/5); efﬁcient: 40 High: p = (3/5); efﬁcient: 20 Signrank tests (p-values)
Low vs. High
Predicted Actual “Optimum” Predicted Actual “Optimum”
LI 40 46.71 (12.96) 33.40 (3.16) 20 32.21 (15.80) 19.10 (5.97) 0.0002
EX 50 52.54 (7.84) 50.00 (0.04) 50 49.25 (5.56) 48.47 (0.79) 0.0324





LI vs. EX 0.0144 0.0000
LI vs. RE 0.0002 0.0000
EX vs. RE 0.0243 0.0000
Remark:Foreachcomparisonp-valuesarebasedonthemeaninvestmentlevelsofindividualinvestors.Thesignranktestsarebasedon40matchedpairs(i.e.40investors),
the Ranksum tests have m = n = 40 observations per remedy. Tests are two-sided, standard deviations appear in parentheses.276 R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296
RE-High the average investment level is substantially below the predicted level.16 In the
other four treatments the mean reliance levels are fairly close to the predicted levels. When
weonlyconsidersubjects’lastinvestmentdecisions(outofatotalofthreepertreatment),we
observe that these are not signiﬁcantly different from the means of all investment decisions
in four of the six treatments (Wilcoxon signrank tests on individual mean investment rates,
5% level). The two exceptions are exactly LI-High and RE-High. Here signiﬁcant learning
effects are found. In both treatments the adjustment is in the direction of the predicted
investment levels. For LI-High the mean investment level decreases (to 25.75 on average)
and for RE-High it increases (to 74.63 on average). Hence, experienced subjects choose
investment levels which are fairly close to the predicted levels.
Together Results 1 and 2 provide strong evidence that both motives for overinvestment
are at work. First, the operation of the full insurance motive is supported by the different
correlations between investment levels and p for EX and LI respectively (cf. Result 1). It
also follows from the across remedies comparison between EX (and RE) and LI reported
in Result 2. Second, the difference between the comparative statics results for RE and EX
(Result1)andthesigniﬁcantdifferencebetweenobservedinvestmentlevelsunderRE-High
and EX-High (Result 2) both point at the presence of the separation prevention motive.17 In
the no-renegotiation setup of Sloof et al. (2003) the same comparative statics results were
obtained. The two experiments together thus provide ample evidence for the relevance of
the two overinvestment motives distinguished in the theoretical literature.
For liquidated damages Result 2(iii) differs from the ﬁndings in Sloof et al. (2003);i n
the absence of renegotiations average reliance expenditures under LI were very close to
the efﬁcient levels. In contrast, here on average overinvestment is observed.18 Hence, when
renegotiations are allowed for (as they typically are in practice), appropriately designed




Theory predicts that renegotiations occur only when it is efﬁcient to do so. This implies
that, given equilibrium investment and breach behavior, they do not occur under LI, EX and
RE-Low, but do occur under RE-High. Our next result relates to this.
16 But note that it is still well above the level observed under RE-Low to justify a positive correlation with p (cf.
Result 1).
17 Note that the fact that we also ﬁnd that investment levels are higher under RE-Low than under EX-Low does
not invalidate this conclusion. The separation prevention motive predicts that the difference between investment
levels under RE-High and RE-Low is signiﬁcantly larger than the difference between those under EX-High and
EX-Low. With the former difference signiﬁcantly positive and the latter difference weakly negative, this indeed
applies.
18 Comparing the renegotiation situation with the no-renegotiation case, we ﬁnd that reliance levels differ sig-
niﬁcantly (at the 5% level) for LI-Low, but not for LI-High. This holds after controlling for the learning effects
observed when renegotiation is allowed.R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 277
Table 3
Occurrence of renegotiations
Inefﬁcient outcome b = R(I) Efﬁcient outcome n
Renegotiation No-ren. Renegotiation No-ren.∗
Agree∗ Disagree Agree Disagree∗
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LI-Low 16 (10) 5 (3) 5 (4) 1 (0) 0 (0) 7 (0) 86 (1) 120
LI-High 20 (12) 0 (0) 5 (4) 2 (0) 0 (0) 4 (0) 89 (2) 120
EX-Low 1 (1) 0 (0) 6 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (0) 107 (0) 120
EX-High 7 (7) 1 (1) 5 (5) 6 (0) 2 (0) 7 (0) 92 (0) 120
RE-Low 43 (31) 1 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 4 (0) 70 (5) 120
RE-High 36 (7) 6 (2) 7 (2) 6 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 63 (5) 120
Remark:Theleft(right)handpartofthetableconcernscaseswhereSeller’sbreachdecisionresultsinaninefﬁcient
(efﬁcient) outcome. Equilibrium predictions are marked with an *. Within parentheses appear the number of non-
equilibrium breach decisions.
Result 3. Actual renegotiations almost never (<1%) occur when it is inefﬁcient to do so.
In case it is efﬁcient to renegotiate, actual renegotiations take place in about 83% of the




Here the breach decision of Seller would by itself result in an inefﬁcient outcome. The right
hand part concerns cases where Seller’s breach decision is efﬁcient. Then renegotiations
are not needed to arrive at the efﬁcient outcome. (When b = R(I) both trade and separation
are efﬁcient.) The columns labeled ‘agree’ report the number of observations in which the
parties arrived at an agreement during the renegotiations. Under ‘disagree’ we report the
number of renegotiations that ended in disagreement. The columns labeled ‘no-ren.’ list
the number of instances in which at least one of the subjects within a pair did not want to
renegotiate.
Apart from simply refusing to do so, in the experiment there is a second way to reveal
an unwillingness to renegotiate efﬁcient outcomes. Subjects could always demand at least
their threat point. When Seller’s breach decision is efﬁcient, such that the surplus up for
renegotiation falls short of the sum of the two threat points, such a strategy would lead to
disagreement. For this reason we interpret renegotiations of efﬁcient outcomes that end in
disagreement as indicative of an unwillingness to renegotiate (column (6) in Table 3). The
remaining renegotiations that take place are referred to as actual renegotiations in Result 3.
These are the numbers reported in the columns (1), (2) and (5). We then observe that actual
renegotiations of efﬁcient outcomes (column (5)) take place in only 4 out of 540 cases.
The picture is markedly different when it is efﬁcient to renegotiate. Then actual renego-
tiations take place in overall 136 out of 164 cases (83%). These cases mainly belong to the
LI and RE remedies. Yet there seems to be no systematic pattern over the Low and High
treatments.
Overall we conclude that the occurrence of renegotiations conditional on the actual




that deviate from the equilibrium predictions.
Under expectation damages renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes are rather infrequent.
But when they occur, they can be attributed completely to dis-equilibrium breach behav-
ior. This holds because under expectation damages the breach decision is predicted to be
efﬁcient, irrespective of the reliance level chosen. An inefﬁcient outcome after the breach
decision stage is thus necessarily a consequence of a non-equilibrium breach decision. Un-
der LI and RE-Low the situation is more complicated. There inefﬁcient outcomes can be
caused by either non-equilibrium investment levels or non-equilibrium breach decisions.19
The numbers within parentheses in Table 3 report the latter. Overall for LI and RE-Low we
observe that around 66% (56 out of 85) of the actual renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes
are caused by non-equilibrium breach decisions.
Only under RE-High renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes are actually predicted to
occur. In particular, given I∗
RE = 85 they should occur when b = 7000. Theoretically we
thus should expect (3/5) · 120 = 72 renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes. The observed
number of 42 is much lower. Moreover, nine of these can be attributed to non-equilibrium
breach decisions. Only the remaining 33 observations can be attributed to Buyer trying to
prevent separation through overinvestment. Hence, compared to the theoretical prediction
Buyer invests too little. A possible explanation for this could be that Buyer’s gains from the
renegotiations are smaller than predicted. The next result relates to this issue.
Result 4. First and accepted offers under LI, EX and RE give Buyer on average a share
above the equal split and below the theoretically predicted ‘split-the-difference’ solution.
Under LI and RE ﬁrst offers and ﬁnally accepted offers differ in the return on investment
and in the remuneration of investment costs.
Table4reportstheoutcomeoftherenegotiationsafteraninefﬁcientbreachdecision.Per
treatment we separately report characteristics of ﬁrst offers and of accepted offers. While
theory predicts that ﬁrst offers are immediately accepted, in practice this is not always the
case. Column (1) reports the average equilibrium prediction for Buyer’s share given actual
investment; the ‘split-the-difference’ solution. The next column reports her average actual
shareandcolumn(3)theaverageequalsplitoutcome.Alsotheaveragenumberofbargaining
rounds until agreement is reported, together with the number of observations on which the
averages are based. In all treatments accepted offers lie in between the equal split and the
‘split-the-difference’ solution. On average Buyers thus earn less in the renegotiations than
predicted. This supports the ﬁrst part of Result 4.
For investment incentives the marginal return on investment is important. Under LI only
6 of the 41 renegotiations reported in Table 4 take place after an inefﬁcient decision not to
breach. In all these cases Seller decided not to breach, although separation is efﬁcient (i.e.
19 Clearly,inefﬁcientoutcomesmayresultafterbothadis-equilibriumreliancelevelandanon-equilibriumbreach
decision. In that case, like under expectation damages, we attribute the inefﬁcient outcome to the non-equilibrium
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Table 4
Outcome of renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes
Buyer’s average share # of rounds n
Predicted Actual Equal split
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LI-Low First 6460 4274 3560 · 21
Accepted 6447 5519 3484 2.31 16
LI-High First 5050 2825 3338 · 20
Accepted 5050 4588 3338 2.25 20
EX-Low First 8400 5000 3000 · 1
Accepted 8400 5500 3000 2 1
EX-High First 6213 3775 3438 · 8
Accepted 6257 5843 3429 1.86 7
RE-Low First 6579 4964 3358 · 44
Accepted 6637 5567 3378 2 43
RE-High First 7197 6282 4185 · 42
Accepted 6915 6716 4097 1.69 36
Remark: # of rounds gives the average number of bargaining rounds. n denotes the number of observations.
b = 7000 and I<60). The remaining 35 observations concern inefﬁcient breaches; Seller
decidedtobreach,whiletradebetweentheoriginalpartiesisefﬁcient(eitherbecauseb = 0,
or b = 7000 and I ≥ 60). This also applies for all 86 renegotiations observed under RE.
We therefore concentrate on renegotiations that follow after an inefﬁcient breach. For these
cases, Table 5 present results from regressing ﬁrst offers and ﬁnal agreements on the value
of the outside bid, the investment level, the squared investment level (i.e. investment costs)
and a period trend. The latter is included to correct the estimates for possible experience
effects.
In the column for ﬁrst offers under liquidated damages, we observe that the return
Seller offers to Buyer for her investment is not signiﬁcantly different from the predicted
return of 50. In his ﬁrst offer Seller also treats investment costs as sunk and does not
Table 5
Regressions explaining ﬁrst/accepted offers after inefﬁcient breach
LI RE
Pred. First offer Accepted Pred. First offer Accepted
Const. 3900 −760 (1689) 3915(893)∗∗∗ 500 −224 (903) 556 (729)
b −.5 −.314(.106)∗∗∗ −.452(.055)∗∗∗ −.5 −.091(.051)∗ −.250(.042)∗∗∗
I 50 78.0 (56.8) −39.9 (30.65) 50 65.6(32.3)∗∗ 34.3 (26.3)
I2 0 .034 (.464) .987(.253)∗∗∗ 1 .284 (.300) .815(.248)∗∗∗
t 0 91.2 (88.3) 105(44.5)∗∗ 07 7 .0(40.3)∗ 59.4(33.2)∗
n 45 35 30 93 86 79
Adj. R2 .46 .81 .67 .81
Remark: Regressions explaining Buyer’s share. Standard deviations within parentheses. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
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remuneratethese.20 ThisfollowsbecausethecoefﬁcientforI2 appearstobeinsigniﬁcant,as
is theoretically predicted. Comparing these results with those for ﬁnally accepted offers we
notice that the return on investment has gone down, while the remuneration of investment
costs has increased. A similar pattern emerges for ﬁrst offers and accepted offers under
reliance damages, see the right hand part of Table 5. This gives the second part of Result 5.
The observed differences between ﬁrst offers and accepted offers suggest a conﬂict




he makes the ﬁrst offer. Previous experiments have already shown that such self-serving
biases may result in bargaining impasse and costly delay (cf. Babcock & Loewenstein,
1997, Camerer, 2003). Moreover, they may affect investment incentives and induce parties
to invest more than is individually rational (cf. Sloof, Sonnemans, & Oosterbeek, 2004). It
should be noted, however, that while the results are consistent with self-serving biases, they
do not prove that such biases are indeed the driving forces, as we have no direct evidence
on this.
For liquidated damages it follows from Table 5 that, when it comes to renegotiations,
Buyer gets a lower marginal return on investment than predicted. Yet the actual investment
levels chosen under LI exceed the predicted ones (cf. Table 2). This suggests that Buyer
may overinvest not only from a social, but also from a selﬁsh point of view. To examine
this more thoroughly, we ran regressions with Buyer’s net payoff as dependent variable,
and investment and investment squared as independent variables. We also included a time
trend. The investment levels that are optimal from a selﬁsh point of view (along with their
standard errors) can be calculated from the estimation results and are reported in Table 2.I n
the RE-High treatment the variance in actual bargaining outcomes was too large to obtain
sensible estimation results.22
Two comparisions of interest can be made. First, when we compare the “optimum”
investment levels with the predicted ones, we observe that they are not that different. It is
indeed optimal to invest more under EX and RE than under LI, as is predicted. Also in line
with theoretical predictions, the correlation between optimum investment levels and p is
negative under LI and zero under EX. It thus appears that actual breach and renegotiation
behavior indeed provides the two predicted motives to overinvest. Second, the calculated
optimum investment levels are close to the actual investment levels for RE-Low, EX-Low
and EX-High. For the LI-treatments actual levels exceed the optimum levels. Here Buyer
overinvests from a selﬁsh point of view. A potential explanation for this is the self-serving
bias mentioned above.
Overall we conclude that the actual breach and renegotiation outcomes indeed provide
the two theoretically predicted motives to overinvest under EX and RE. Apart from that, a
20 At the same time, however, Seller offers Buyer a smaller ﬁxed payment than predicted; theory predicts a ﬁxed
payment of 3900 − .5 · b, i.e. 3900 for b = 0 and 400 for b = 7000.
21 Note in this regard also that average ﬁrst offers are substantially below ﬁnally agreed shares (cf. Table 4).
22 IntheregressionofnetpayoffsthecoefﬁcientsofbothIandI2 wereinsigniﬁcantandtheadjustedR2 equalled
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self-serving bias seems to lead Buyers to anticipate the outcome of the renegotiation stage
incorrectly. This provides an explanation why Buyers also overinvest under appropriately
designed liquidated damages (albeit to a much smaller extent).
5. Reliance without sophisticated remedies
5.1. Basic setup, predictions and design
5.1.1. Basic setup
The results reported in the previous section reveal that sophisticated breach remedies
causeoverreliance,asistheoreticallypredicted(exceptforLI).Wenextturntothequestion
whether they are actually needed for protection against holdup. In order to answer this
we investigate situations where sophisticated breach remedies are absent. We consider two
extreme (degenerate) forms of breach remedies. The ﬁrst one is speciﬁc performance (SP).
AsnotedintheIntroduction,speciﬁcperformancecorrespondstoa“propertyrule”common
in civil law systems. Under this remedy Seller is obliged to sell his unit to Buyer if she
requires him to do so. This amounts to a situation in which the breach payment is inﬁnitely
high; δSP(I) =∞ . The second one is the situation without an initial contract (NC). Then
there is simply no contract that can be breached and Seller is free to go. This corresponds
to the situation of δNC(I) = 0 and f = 0 in the setup of Section 2.1.
Naturally, in both cases breach decision stage 3 is obsolete. Under NC there is no initial
contractthatcanbebreached.AftertheoutsidebidbecomesknownBuyerandSellersimply
negotiate about the terms of (possible) trade. In these negotiations the threat point of Seller
equals his outside bid, while the threat point of Buyer equals zero.23 In case of SP there
exists a contract which parties agreed upon in stage 0, but unilateral breach of this contract
is forbidden. Parties have the opportunity to renegotiate this contract in stage 4. They may




(R(I) ≥ b). In that case Buyer is predicted to get a share equal to (1/2)(R(I) − b), while
Seller obtains the remainder. Note that in the negotiations Seller can “hold up” Buyer,
such that she captures only 50% of the marginal return on investment. Anticipating this,
Buyer chooses an investment level that is only 50% of the efﬁcient level: INC = (1/2)I∗.25
Given the equilibrium investment levels negotiations take place only when b = 0. Table 6
summarizes these predictions.
23 In the notation of Section 2.1: RS = R(I),T P B = 0 and TPS = b (and f = 0).
24 Here we have: RS = b, TPB = R(I) − f and TPS = f = 600.
25 As shown by Segal and Whinston (2000) holdup in this case cannot be solved by an exclusivity provision.
Under such a provision Seller is restricted to sell his unit to Buyer only (but he is not required to do so). In our
setup Buyer then obtains (1/2) · max{R(I),b}=(1/2) · max{R(I) − b,0}+(1/2)b in the renegotiations. This is
simply (1/2)b on top of what she receives in the no contract case, and therefore investment incentives are not




Investment level I INC < ﬁrst best ISP > ﬁrst best
Correlation between I and p Negative Negative
Occurrence of renegotiation Only if b = 0 Only if b = 7000
Efﬁciency of renegotiation Efﬁcient Efﬁcient
UnderspeciﬁcperformanceBuyercanalwaysclaimtradeatapriceoff = 600.Renego-
tiations therefore will only take place when trade between the original trading partners ap-
pearstobeinefﬁcient(R(I) <b ).InthatcaseBuyerobtains(R(I) − f) + (1/2)(b − R(I)),
where the second term equals the gain from renegotiations. Note that when the investment
appears socially unproﬁtable (i.e. when b = 7000 >R (I)), Buyer still receives half of the
(private) return on investment. In that sense Buyer is partially – for 50% – insured against
separation. Under full insurance the equilibrium investment level is 50, while in the ab-
sence of insurance it equals the efﬁcient level I∗. Under 50%-insurance the equilibrium
investment level then just equals the average: ISP = (1/2)(50 + I∗). This yields predicted
investment levels of 45 in the Low-treatment and 35 in the High-treatment. Hence, just
like the sophisticated remedies based on a “liability rule”, also the SP breach remedy is
predicted to cause overreliance. The driving force is the partial insurance of Buyer against
separation.
It may be instructive to point out here that the remedy of speciﬁc performance differs
from a so-called “exclusivity provision”. Under such a provision Seller is restricted to sell
his unit to Buyer only, but in contrast to SP he is not required to do so. As shown by Segal
and Whinston (2000), an exclusivity provision does not protect speciﬁc investments against
holdup. In particular, under an exclusivity provision Buyer obtains (1/2) · max{R(I),b}=




We ran two sessions for the NC-game and two sessions for the SP-game. As before,
in each session subjects were confronted with both the low and the high level of p. Per
session 20 subjects participated, so that 80 new subjects participated in four sessions. Pa-
rameterchoiceswereexactlythesameasbefore.SubjectsearnedonaverageUSD21intwo
hours.
The additional sessions resembled the previous ones for the sophisticated breach reme-
dies as closely as possible. The only difference was that the game played in each period
was now framed as a three-stage game. Breach decision stage 3 was dropped and the
renegotiation stage was labeled as being the third stage. Thus, after the wheel of for-
tune came to a stop subjects immediately turned to the renegotiation stage. In the com-
puter screens (cf. Appendix A) there were only two instead of four columns in the upper
table.R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 283
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Reliance levels
The main ﬁnding concerning investment levels is summarized in Result 5.
Result 5. (i) In case of NC underinvestment is observed in the Low-treatment, but not
in the High-treatment. (ii) SP always leads to overinvestment. (iii) Under NC investment
levels are decreasing in p, while under SP they remain virtually constant when p changes.
Evidence for Result 5 is provided in Table 7. As before statistical tests are based on
individual mean investment levels. There appears to be no holdup problem when the prob-
ability of a high outside bid is high. In the absence of a contract Buyer chooses the ﬁrst
best investment level on average. In the Low-treatment holdup does occur, but is less se-
vere than predicted. Under SP Buyer invests signiﬁcantly more than under NC. Substantial
overinvestment occurs mainly in the High-treatment, as predicted.
Comparing the actual reliance levels for Low and High, Table 7 shows that investment
levels are decreasing in p under NC. In case of SP the data reveal no signiﬁcant differences
at the 5% level between the Low and the High-treatment. This indicates the presence of the
insurance motive. In contrast to theoretical predictions, however, insurance appears to be
complete rather than partial.26
The correlation between I and p – i.e. the comparison between the Low and the High-
treatment – enables us to identify the two motives to overinvest (cf. Tables 1 and 6). From
a more practical point of view the Low-treatment seems more realistic though. In reality
parties will typically select trading partners with whom they believe trade is likely to be
efﬁcient. For the Low-treatment we then observe that, without a contract, there will be
underinvestment. The various breach remedies appear to overcome this holdup problem;
for all of them investment levels are signiﬁcantly higher than under no contract (see the
lower part in Table 7). Breach remedies thus indeed serve the useful purpose of protecting
speciﬁc investments. All the remedies considered, however, induce overreliance. Simply
comparing the average investment levels reported in Tables 2 and 7 suggests that liquidated
damages are best, as they induce the least overinvestment. In the Low-treatment differences
between LI and SP are not signiﬁcant though. This results from the fact that there is much
more variation in investment levels under LI than under SP (see the standard deviations
reportedinthetables).Moreover,thecomparisonofinvestmentlevelsdoesnottakepossible
inefﬁciencies at the renegotiation stage into account. In Section 6 we return to this when
we compare all the cases considered on efﬁciency grounds.
5.2.2. Renegotiations
The ﬁrst result in this subsection concerns the occurrence of actual renegotiations. As
before, actual renegotiations refer to the cases where parties display a clear willingness to
renegotiate.
26 The difference between SP-Low and SP-High is almost signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Yet economically the
difference is modest; only a 7% decrease is observed, while a decrease of 22% is predicted. This explains why we




































































Mean investment levels by treatment and tests for equality
Low: p = (1/5); efﬁcient: 40 High: p = (3/5); efﬁcient: 20 Signrank tests
(p-values) Low vs.
High Damages Predicted Actual “Optimum” Predicted Actual “Optimum”
NC 20 28.83 (12.34) 12.00 (7.80) 10 21.88 (13.07) 3.44 (7.30) 0.0010
SP 45 49.88 (3.89) 47.54 (2.39) 35 46.63 (9.87) 35.93 (2.90) 0.0546
Ranksum tests (p-values) Ranksum tests
(p-values)
NC vs. SP, LI, EX, RE 0.0000 0.0000
SP vs. LI 0.0988 0.0000
SP vs. EX 0.1119 0.1237
SP vs. RE 0.0004 0.0000
Remark: For each comparison p-values are based on the mean investment levels of individual investors. The signrank tests are based on 40 matched pairs (i.e. 40
investors), the Ranksum tests have m = n = 40 observations per remedy. Tests are two-sided, standard deviations appear in parentheses.R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 285
Table 8
Occurrence of renegotiations
Inefﬁcient outcome b = R(I) Efﬁcient outcome n
Renegotiation No-ren. Renegotiation No-ren.∗
Agree∗ Disagree Agree Disagree∗
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NC-Low 85 8 3 2 3 0 19 120
NC-High 41 (1) 1 7 2 8 1 60 120
SP-Low 16 1 6 0 1 19 77 (1) 120
SP-High 55 5 10 1 0 7 42 (1) 120
Remark: The left (right) hand part of the table concerns cases where the outcome before stage 4 is inefﬁcient
(efﬁcient). Equilibrium predictions are marked with an *. Within parentheses appear the number of observations
with b = 7000 and I>60.
Result 6. Under NC actual renegotiations occur in around 12% of the cases when it is
inefﬁcient to do so. Under SP this is almost never the case (<1%). When it is efﬁcient
to renegotiate, actual renegotiations take place in 89% of the cases. Under NC they occur
mostlyafterb = 0,butalsooccurwhenb = 7000.UnderSPtheyonlyoccurafterb = 7000.
Table 8 presents the overall outcomes of the renegotiation stage. It has a similar setup as
Table 3. Under NC the status quo outcome is no-trade, while under SP it equals trade. The
left (right) hand part of the table considers situations in which the status quo outcome turns
out to be inefﬁcient (efﬁcient), given the actual outside bid and the investment level chosen.
Theory predicts that actual renegotiations occur only when the status quo is inefﬁcient.
Table 8 reveals that actual renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes (columns (1) and (2)) take
place in overall 212 out of 238 cases (89%). Actual renegotiations of efﬁcient outcomes
(column (5)) are essentially absent under SP, but in the absence of a contract occur in 11
out of 91 cases (12%).
Withoutacontractthestatusquooutcomeequalsno-trade.Thisisnecessarilyinefﬁcient
whenb = 0,givenR(I) > 0.No-tradeisalsoinefﬁcientwhenb = 7000andI>60.Theory
predicts that INC < 60, and thus that the latter situation does not occur. Table 8 reveals that
thisisindeedthecase;instanceswithb = 7000andI>60arealmostabsentunderNC,see
the number in parentheses. Hence, actual renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes (almost)
only follow after b = 0. Actual renegotiations of efﬁcient outcomes occur after b = 7000
only.
In case of speciﬁc performance the status quo outcome equals trade. Trade is inefﬁcient
only when b = 7000 and I<60. Theory predicts that ISP < 60, and thus that an inefﬁcient
outcomeariseswheneverb = 7000.FromthenumbersinparenthesesinTable8weobserve
that this indeed applies; only in two instances we have I>60 together with b = 7000. In
line with theoretical predictions, when b = 7000 the status quo outcome is (almost) always
inefﬁcient, and actual renegotiations are likely to take place.
Overall we conclude that the occurrence of renegotiations conditional on the actual
investment made is well in line with theoretical predictions. Renegotiations mainly take
place when there are efﬁciency gains to be made ex post. Yet under NC they sometimes
occur when it is inefﬁcient to do so. Non-equilibrium reliance levels do not appear to affect
the actual occurrence of renegotiations (cf. the numbers within parentheses in Table 8).286 R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296
Table 9
Outcome of renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes
Buyer’s average share # of rounds n
Predicted Actual Equal split
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NC-Low First 1909 1445 1909 · 93
Accepted 1888 1755 1888 1.61 85
NC-High First 1543 1283 1543 · 41
Accepted 1544 1498 1544 1.58 40
SP-Low First 5856 5347 3500 · 17
Accepted 5853 5950 3500 1.88 16
SP-High First 5621 4950 3500 · 60
Accepted 5618 5675 3500 1.98 55
Remark: # of rounds gives the average number of bargaining rounds. n denotes the number of observations.
Forinvestmentincentivestheactualrenegotiationoutcomesarealsoimportant.Wefocus
on the renegotiations that occur when the status quo appears to be inefﬁcient (columns (1)
and (2) in Table 8).27
Result 7. First and accepted offers under NC give Buyer on average a share below the
predicted‘split-the-difference’solution.IncaseofSPacceptedoffersonaveragegiveBuyer
her predicted share. In the absence of a contract Buyer gets a smaller return on investment
than predicted.
Table 9 reports the outcome of actual renegotiations when the status quo appears to be
inefﬁcient. This table has the same setup as Table 4. Under both NC and SP ﬁrst offers give
Buyer on average a smaller share than the predicted ‘split-the-difference’ solution. Final
agreements do give the buyer a larger share than ﬁrst offers do. But in the process of getting
a larger share some of the surplus is lost. Across Low and High, it takes on average 1.6
rounds to reach agreement under NC and almost 2 rounds under SP. On average Buyer is
therefore better off by accepting Seller’s initial offer.
To examine more closely the determinants of the bargaining results, we regressed ﬁrst
offers and accepted offers on the investment level, the squared investment level and a time
trend. Results are reported in Table 10. Theoretically the sunk investment costs I2 do not
affect bargaining outcomes. However, under NC we do ﬁnd that sunk costs matter. The
coefﬁcient on I2 is signiﬁcant. When we consider Sellers’ ﬁrst offers, the coefﬁcient on I
appears insigniﬁcant. Because the coefﬁcient for I2 is less than one, the marginal return on
investment always falls short of the marginal costs. For accepted offers the coefﬁcient on I
appears to be signiﬁcant. The marginal return on investment then equals 49% on average.28
This corresponds well with the predicted 50% marginal return. However, this return is
27 Under NC only 1 out of the 135 renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes takes place after b = 7000 (see the
number in parentheses in Table 8). We excluded this observation and focus on those for b = 0. Under SP all
renegotiations of inefﬁcient outcomes belong to b = 7000.
28 With an average investment level of 25.56 this follows from: 15.7 + 2 · 0.646 · (25.56) = 48.72.R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 287
Table 10
Regressions explaining ﬁrst/accepted offers
NC, b = 0S P , b = 7000
Pred. First offer Accepted Pred. First offer Accepted
Const. 500 549(194)∗∗∗ 768(136)∗∗∗ 3400 2424(880)∗∗∗ 2415(382)∗∗∗
I 50 13.9(10.8) 15.7(7.65)∗∗ 50 68.6(64.4) 172(29.2)∗∗∗
I2 0 .575(.152)∗∗∗ .646(.107)∗∗∗ 0 −.229(1.04) −2.02(.476)∗∗∗
t 0 −4.65(15.3) −9.34(10.7) 0 −.341(38.08) −4.31(16.9)
n 144 134 125 96 77 71
Adj. R2 .65 .82 .19 .59
Remark: Regressions explaining Buyer’s share. Standard deviations within parentheses. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
at 1%/5%/10% level are marked with ***/**/*.
obtained only after some inefﬁcient delay (cf. Table 9). The overall return on investment is
thus less than predicted, supporting the last part of Result 7.
Under SP Sellers’ ﬁrst offers give Buyers a return on investment that is not signiﬁcantly
different from the predicted return of 50. For accepted offers the marginal return at the
average investment level equals −11.5%.29 This suggests that the realized marginal return
on investment is smaller than the predicted (and initially offered) value of 50. It must be
notedthoughthat,incontrasttotheno-contractsituation,hererenegotiationsarenotneeded
to obtain a return on investment. As long as no agreement has been reached, or when no
renegotiations take place at all, Buyer gets a 100% return through her threat point. A lower
return on investment in the actual renegotiations may induce a lower willingness to enter
these renegotiations, thereby increasing investment incentives. Indeed, in 13 out of the 16
cases in which parties did not renegotiate an inefﬁcient outcome, it was Buyer who did not
want to bargain. Therefore, for SP conclusions for the actual return on investment remain
ambiguous.
Without a contract Buyer obtains a lower return on investment than predicted. However,
the actual investment levels chosen under NC exceed the predicted ones (cf. Table 7). This
suggeststhatBuyersdonotchoosetheinvestmentlevelthatisoptimalforthemgivenactual
bargaining outcomes. We estimated these “optimum” investment levels in the same way as
we did for the sophisticated breach remedies. These are reported in Table 7 as well.
For NC the “optimum” investment levels do not differ signiﬁcantly from zero. The
variance in actual bargaining outcomes is then particularly large, resulting in large standard
deviations. Relative to these calculated optima Buyer invests too much (from a selﬁsh point
of view). The ﬁnding that holdup is less severe than standard theory predicts is a rather
robust one within the experimental economics literature.30 The explanation that is typically
putforwardispositivereciprocity.InvestmentbyBuyermakesbothagentspotentiallybetter
off and thus can be considered a kind act. Seller might want to reward this kind behavior
with a larger than predicted return. If such reciprocal behavior is anticipated, it is indeed
optimal for Buyer to invest more than predicted. In the current experiment underinvestment
is also less severe than predicted, but here Buyer’s investment behavior is not optimal. One
29 With an average investment level of 45.42 this follows from: 172 − 2 · 2.02 · (45.42) =− 11.50.
30 See e.g. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Hackett (1994), K¨ onigstein
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possible explanation why positive reciprocity does not justify our current ﬁnding of less
holdup is the presence of a self-serving bias already mentioned in Section 4. Buyer may
think that she deserves – and will be able to obtain – a high return on investment because
she bears the full costs of investment. At the same time Seller may believe that he himself
is entitled to a large return share to compensate him for (the possibility of) an unlucky draw
of a low alternative trading opportunity. The asymmetry of the situation allows for such
self-serving assessments.31 The settings in which positive reciprocity appears to work in
alleviating holdup are typically more symmetric. Again it must be noted though that, in the
absence of direct evidence on self-serving biases, this is merely our interpretation.
Also in the SP-High treatment Buyers tend to invest too much from a selﬁsh perspective.
Apart from a self-serving bias, another (arguably more convincing) explanation for this
result is that some Buyers overlook that when their own threat point increases, the net
surplus up for renegotiation decreases (when b = 7000). They thus take the gross marginal
return to be 100% in every contingency, making an investment of 50 optimal. Indeed, in the
High-treatment the distribution of reliance levels is very concentrated around the mode of
50 (the frequency belonging to this mode exceeds 80%). Under SP-Low actual investment
levels are very close to the “optimum” ones.
6. Efﬁciency comparison
The ultimate aim of breach remedies is to increase efﬁciency. In this section we compare
all ﬁve different cases of Sections 4 and 5 in terms of efﬁciency. Theory predicts that
efﬁciency losses are solely due to inefﬁcient investments. The breach and renegotiation
stage cause no waste of the available surplus. The predicted efﬁciency ranking thus follows
directly from investment incentives. In particular, theory predicts that in both the Low
and the High-treatment efﬁciency is highest under LI. Our ﬁnal result reveals that realized
efﬁciency deviates from this prediction.
Result 8. (i) In the Low-treatment efﬁciency is highest under SP. Both investment and
bargaining inefﬁciencies are smallest in this case. (ii) In the High-treatment efﬁciency is
highest under NC. This is solely due to the small investment inefﬁciency under NC.
The result is supported by the ﬁndings on joint payoffs reported in Table 11. As before
the amounts are normalized per bargaining round. Column (1) gives the expected joint
payoffs when subjects make equilibrium choices. The second column contains the average
realized joint payoffs. By subtracting these amounts from the maximum surplus S(I∗) the
overall observed inefﬁciencies are obtained. Columns (3) to (5) disentangle these into three
different sources: investment inefﬁciency, bargaining inefﬁciency and residual inefﬁciency.
Investment inefﬁciency equals the loss in expected surplus due to suboptimal investment.
In calculating the investment inefﬁciency it is assumed that the bargaining stage is efﬁcient.
31 In the words of Babcock and Loewenstein (1997, p. 120):“...assoon as asymmetries are introduced between
the parties – for example, different nonagreement values or costs of nonsettlement, or subtle differences in roles
– both parties’ notions of fairness will tend to gravitate toward settlements that favor themselves.”R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 289
Table 11












Low NC 3400 2586abcd 332 842 40 0.89 0.68
SP 3775 3575aef 121 100 4 0.99 0.94
LI 3800 2792beg 244 729 35 1 0.73
EX 3700 3292cgh 270 221 17 0.97 0.87
RE 3700 2725dfh 535 564 −24 0.97 0.72
High NC 4900 4169i 248 535 48 0.98 0.83
SP 4775 3894j 823 331 −48 0.96 0.78
LI 5000 4040k 518 367 75 1 0.81
EX 4100 3813l 921 225 41 0.82 0.76
RE 2275 2535ijkl 1940 527 −2 0.46 0.51
Remark:S(I∗) = 3800intheLow-treatmentsandS(I∗) = 5000intheHigh-treatments.ItholdsthatS(I∗) − (2) =
(3) + (4) + (5). Subscripts indicate that amounts within the second column are signiﬁcantly different from each
other according to a two-sided ranksum test (at the 10% level).
The bargaining inefﬁciency in column (4) is the sum of losses owing to parties deciding
not to renegotiate when they should and losses due to delay of agreement.32 The third
source of inefﬁciency is due to the fact that the empirical distribution of b conditional on
the investment level chosen may differ from the theoretical distribution.33 The resulting
(in)efﬁciency cannot be attributed to subjects’ decisions and is therefore referred to as
residual inefﬁciency. The last two columns express predicted and actual joint payoffs as
fractions of maximum expected joint payoffs S(I∗).
Liquidated damages appear less efﬁcient than predicted and are outperformed either by
SP (Low-treatment) or NC (High-treatment).34 In the Low-treatment SP appears to be most
efﬁcient, both in terms of investment efﬁciency and in terms of bargaining efﬁciency. The
reason that speciﬁc performance generates small investment inefﬁciencies in this treatment
is that the variation in investment levels is very low. Although the average investment level
under LI-Low (46.71) is closer to the efﬁcient level of 40 than the level under SP-Low
(49.88) is, there is much more variation in investment levels under LI-Low. While over-
and underinvestments cancel out and make the average investment under LI-Low closer
to the efﬁcient level, each deviation results in an efﬁciency loss that increases more than




will be. In contrast to the theoretical predictions renegotiations namely occur quite often
underLI(cf.Result3).AsdiscussedinSection4.2,aroundtwo-thirdoftheserenegotiations
32 Noticethatthebreachdecisionitselfcanneverbeasourceofinefﬁciencybecauseaninefﬁcientbreachdecision
can always be renegotiated.
33 Ourdesignensuredthattherealizedfrequenciesofhighoutsidebidsexactlyequalled20percentand60percent
in the Low and High treatments respectively. That is, we controlled the unconditional empirical distribution of b.
We did not control the distribution of b conditional on the investment made.
34 Although note that the difference between LI-High and NC-High is not signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.290 R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296
are triggered by a non-equilibrium breach decision of Seller. Seller’s breach decision thus
adds “noise” to the process, because quite often a non-equilibrium choice is made. Also
the outcomes of the renegotiations differ substantially from the predicted ones (cf. Result
4). This all may make it hard for Buyers to form correct expectations about the return
on investment. In contrast, under SP-Low Buyers seem to have an easier task because
renegotiations take place only when they are predicted to occur (cf. Result 6) and lead to
outcomes which are fairly close to the predicted ones (cf. Result 7). This also explains
why bargaining losses are small under SP-Low. Also under expectation damages relatively
small amounts are wasted in the bargaining stage. This follows because very few pairs then
actually enter the renegotiations.
In the High-treatment none of the breach remedies performs better than NC in terms
of overall efﬁciency. Here the driving force is investment inefﬁciency. In the absence of
a contract holdup is much less severe than predicted, keeping investment inefﬁciencies
lowerthanpredicted.Bargaininginefﬁcienciesaresubstantial,asunderallbreachremedies
considered.
The above ﬁndings indicate that when the probability p that separation is efﬁcient is low,
parties are best off by signing a contract protected by a property rule (i.e. SP). In contrast,
whenpishighitisintheparties’jointinteresttowritenocontractatall.TheoreticallySPis
optimal only in the limit when p → 0, while NC is optimal only when p → 1. Our results
suggest that empirically the cutoff values for p making SP and NC optimal respectively, are
considerably bounded away from these extreme values. The range of p-values for which
it may be optimal to make elaborate contractual arrangements with sophisticated damage
payments may thus be more limited than theory predicts.
For the LI, EX and RE treatments the efﬁciency levels can also be compared with those
achievedintheno-renegotiationsetupofSloofetal.(2003).Interestingly,foralltreatments
efﬁciency levels are higher in the latter. Only in the RE-High treatment the difference
is small. The explanation for this lies in two observations. First, reliance levels in the no-
renegotiationsetuparesomewhatclosertotheefﬁcientlevels.Thepresenceofrenegotiation
typically induces higher reliance levels on average, and thus more overreliance. Second, in
the no-renegotiation setup losses due to suboptimal breach decisions appear to be small,
while in the current setup we ﬁnd substantial losses during the bargaining stage. Overall
the introduction of ex post renegotiations appears to decrease efﬁciency.
7. Conclusion
This paper reports the outcomes of a series of laboratory experiments conducted to
evaluatetheperformanceofseveralcommonlyusedbreachremedies.Theseremediesallaim
at alleviating the holdup problem that may induce underinvestment in relationship-speciﬁc
assets.Theorysuggeststhatsomeofthebreachremediesleadtotoomuchprotection,asthey
are predicted to induce overinvestment. This result is driven by two motives to overinvest:
the insurance motive and the separation prevention motive.
A previous paper (Sloof et al., 2003) considered breach remedies in a setting that did
not allow for ex post renegotiation. There parties could not renegotiate the outcome that
resulted after the breach decision stage. The results from this earlier experiment are almostR. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 291
completely in line with the theoretical predictions: under optimally designed liquidated
damages reliance is efﬁcient, under expectation damages the insurance motive is indeed




extension is therefore to give parties the opportunity of ex post renegotiation. This paper
does so and tests whether the earlier results found for the different breach remedies carry
over to this more realistic context. Apart from that, we also investigate the two benchmark
cases of speciﬁc performance and no contract. In both these cases sophisticated breach
remedies are absent. Either unilateral breach is not possible, or there is simply no contract
that can be breached.
We obtain two main ﬁndings. First, also in a setting where ex post renegotiations are
possible the insurance motive and the separation prevention motive are at work and cause
overreliance.Speciﬁcally,inlinewiththeoreticalpredictionstheinsurancemotiveispresent
under expectation damages, reliance damages and speciﬁc performance. The separation
prevention motive is operative under reliance damages only. Together with those obtained
in our earlier experiment these results indicate that the two overinvestment motives are very
robust phenomena.
Our second main ﬁnding is that there seems less need for compensatory money damages
thantheorysuggests.Whenexanteseparationislikelytobeefﬁcient(High-treatment),none
ofthebreachremediesperformsbetterthantheno-contractsituation.Themainreasonisthat,
without a contract, holdup appears much less of a problem than predicted. In the opposite
case where ex ante the probability of efﬁcient separation is low (Low-treatment), there is
underinvestmentintheabsenceofacontract.Allbreachremediesthensigniﬁcantlyincrease
investmentlevelsandthusservetheusefulpurposeofprotectingspeciﬁcinvestments.They
do lead to different levels of efﬁciency though. In particular, under speciﬁc performance
overinvestmentisobserved,asispredicted.Buttheoverallinefﬁcienciesobservedunderthis
remedy are very small. In this case speciﬁc performance outperforms all the sophisticated




a more practical perspective, however, the Low-treatment is arguably the more relevant
one. In practice parties will typically contract with partners with whom trade is likely to be
efﬁcient. Our results for the Low-treatment then suggest that a simple speciﬁc performance
clause may perform better than a carefully determined liquidated damages breach remedy.
Put differently, to protect reliance expenditures it may be preferable to use a “property rule”
rather than a “liability rule”.
AsalreadynotedinSection1,variouslegalscholarshavearguedthatinpracticetheremay
be an efﬁciency advantage for speciﬁc performance as the default remedy. The argument
made is that, although speciﬁc performance may lead to costly haggling and inefﬁcient
outcomes, in practice compensatory money damages are likely to be under-compensatory.
The latter may lead to larger inefﬁciencies than speciﬁc performance does. In this regard
Mahoney (2000, p. 127) notes that:292 R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296
“The relative magnitudes of the inefﬁciencies generated by costly renegotiation and
undercompensation are ultimately empirical questions and to date the literature does
not provide data from which we could conﬁdently identify the preferred remedy.”
In our experiment we implemented the theoretically optimal liquidated damages pay-
ment, so the undercompensation problem was absent by construction. Even then it ap-
pearsthat,givenactualbehavior,speciﬁcperformanceperformsbestonefﬁciencygrounds.
Clearly, our experiment just provides a single piece of empirical evidence for a particular
stylized situation, and much work remains to be done to establish how robust our results
are. But we agree with Mahoney that the identiﬁcation of the preferred breach remedy is
ultimately an empirical issue.
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Appendix A
This appendix contains translations of the computer-screens Buyers faced during the
experiment. The example concerns the four-stage game of Section 2 for the case of reliance
damages. In the simpler games of Section 5 the third stage is left out.
In the experiment Buyer has code ‘A’ and Seller code ‘B’. In the overview at the top
of the screen the pie sizes (‘Round pie’) and the threat points (‘Bottom’) are presented as
formulas. When the subject enters the investment T in stage 1, these formulas are replaced
by numbers and the subject has to conﬁrm or change the decision (not shown here).R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 293
After the conﬁrmation the wheel of fortune spins...
The outcome of the wheel of fortune is presented in the overview at top of the screen;
the now irrelevant blue numbers have turned grey.294 R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296
When Seller (B) has chosen ‘X’ (No Breach) the now irrelevant yellow numbers under
‘Y’ have turned grey. (In the three-stage game of Section 5 this stage is absent; without
a contract always case ‘Y’ applies (with the then appropriate numbers), under speciﬁc
performance always case ‘X’ applies.)
At the start of the ﬁnal stage both subjects are asked whether they want to negotiate.R. Sloof et al. / International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 263–296 295
If both are willing to negotiate, the B-player (Seller) formulates the ﬁrst proposal. The
actions of the other player are always displayed in green while own actions always appear
in black. Negotiations end when a proposal is accepted, or the fourth proposal is rejected.
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